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Abstract
This Article explores the fundamental historical change in Colombia’s criminal procedure.
Part I of this Article will present a brief history of the inquisitorial system of criminal procedure,
laying the foundation for an understanding the unique Columbian development of criminal proce-
dure. A description of Colombia’s inquisitorial system follows, focusing especially on structural
barriers in the previous inquisitorial system that hampered effective law enforcement. Part II dis-
cusses the failure of the inquisitorial system. A description of the prosecutorial system adopted in
November 1991 is then presented in Part III.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, Colombia has suffered from one of the
world's highest impunity rates. The Colombian government's
inability to prosecute its most notorious outlaw, Pablo Esco-
* B.A. Summa Cum Laude, Creighton University, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1992.
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bar, is the most prominent recent example of a criminal justice
system in crisis.' During the past thirty years, it is estimated
that only 1.2 to two percent of all crimes reported ended in a
sentence.2 More recently, conviction rates have been just as
dismal. Studies conducted by the Colombian government's
Office of Socio-Juridical Investigations estimate that only
twenty percent of all crimes committed are reported to the au-
thorities.3 Of these, roughly four percent result in a convic-
tion, two percent for the crimes of robbery and assault and bat-
tery,4 with an estimated 1,300,000 cases pending in Colom-
bia's courts. 5 Human rights violations by the military forces-
including torture, disappearances, and assassination-often go
unpunished as well.
Why such a high rate of impunity? The problem generally
is linked to two sources, one attitudinal and the other struc-
tural. For reasons rooted in Colombia's long history of vio-
lence and corruption, crimes go unreported because of skepti-
cism about the system itself or fear of the authorities-or
worse, retribution from the accused.6 Even if a crime is re-
ported, prosecuting the accused has proven difficult.
Criminals have held the sword of Damocles over a frightened
judiciary, bribing, threatening, and killing judges into compli-
ance with their demands.7 Moreover, in 1992 alone, an esti-
mated 217 police have been assassinated by guerrillas and
drug-traffickers.S
Impunity thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Citizens
1. See James Brooke, Escobar Says He'll Surrender if U.S. Protects Family, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1993, at A3.
2. See Gabriel Gutierrez Tovar, Reflexiones sobre la Impunidad, in JUSTICIA, DER-
ECHOS HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD 219, 225 (Hbctor Pefia Diaz ed., 1991).
3. Jaime Giraldo Angel, La Impunidad en Colombia y sus Soluciones: Desjudicializacion.
Instrumento para combatir la impunidad, in JUSTICIA, DERECHOS HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD,
supra note 2, at 119.
4. Daniel Abello Rocco, Fiscalh General de la Nacidn, 93 GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL
2 (1991).
5. Gustavo Gallon Giraldo & Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Constituyente, violencia, y
derechos humanos, 13 REVISTo FORO 37, 42 (Oct. 1990).
6. See Tovar, supra note 2, at 219.
7. For a thorough and in-depth analysis of the violence plaguing Colombia's
judiciary, see Guido Bonilla Pardo & Alejandro Valencia Villa,Justice for Justice: Vio-
lence Against Judges and Lawyers in Colombia: 1979-1991 (1992) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
8. Emergency is Declared in Colombia, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1992, at A16.
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resigned or indifferent to a dysfunctional criminal justice sys-
tem will neither cooperate with nor work to improve it. Citi-
zens have increasingly privatized criminal justice, contributing
to the violence that has earned Colombia the reputation as one
of the world's most dangerous democracies. 9
The other problem is structural. The high impunity rate is
generally viewed as a result of an antiquated criminal justice
system, based upon the inquisitorial model, that has crippled
criminal investigations and produced an almost absolute rate
of impunity.' 0 Without structural changes, many fear that
criminals like Mr. Escobar will continue to be the rule rather
than the exception in Colombia.
Fortunately, in 1991 Colombia ratified a new constitu-
tion." Many believe that such reform is long overdue; others
are skeptical as to the motives for and effectiveness of such a
reform.' 2 As part of the constitutional reform process two im-
portant structural changes in the criminal justice system took
place. First, a secret court system has been created for drug
and terrorism cases. The hope is that judges will be able to
bring criminals to justice while being protected from threats or
assassination through concealment of the judges' identities.' 3
The secret court system, however, is no panacea, due toits
limited scope. Roughly five percent of the crimes committed
in Colombia, essentially organized crime in its ordinary and
9. See, e.g., Susan Benesch, Messrs. Clean: Medellin---postcard; Medellin, Colombia
anti-drug militias, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 1992, at 10.
10. See generally AntonioJose Cancino, Comentarios a la Propuesta de Reforma Consti-
tucional sobre la Fiscah General, 73 GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL 3 (May 14, 1991); see also
Fernando Carrillo Flores, Fiscalth General y Sistema Acusatorio, 68 GACETA CONSTITU-
CIONAL 3 (May 6, 1991).
11. See generally CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution] arts. 11-94;
see also Extradition Outlawed, NEWSDAY, June 30, 1991, at 14.
12. See Steven Flanders & Ana Maria Salazar, Columbia's Purgatory, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
29, 1992, at 2. But see William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colombian Constitu-
tion: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39 (1991).
Professor Banks and Mr. Alvarez concluded that
[i]t is unclear whether the invocation of popular sovereignty to legitimate
the reform process in Bogoti reflects a genuine public demand for a new set
of societal rules and institutions. Instead, it could simply be another epi-
sode of constitutional reform serving as a shield to protect the less populist
and shorter term political goals of those in power. Legally, it makes no dif-
ference.
Id. at 85.
13. See Colombia Struggles to Seal Its Judges'Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 10.
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political manifestations, fall under its jurisdiction. In order to
combat the other ninety-five percent of crimes-robbery, lar-
ceny, rape, murder, etc.,-Colombia is undergoing a shift from
an inquisitorial' 4 to a prosecutorial system of criminal proce-
dure, through the creation of the Fiscalh General de la Nacidn
(the "Fiscalhh"), or central prosecutor's office.
This reform is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First,
Colombia has joined a worldwide trend toward the
prosecutorial system, as seen, for example, in the case of Italy
in 1988. Indeed, for a civil law country to adopt a
prosecutorial system is almost by definition an extraordinary
task, given the massive change in institutional structure and
break with historical tradition involved. Second, Colombia, re-
lying upon its long heritage of respect for the judiciary and the
rule of law, 15 was able to reform its criminal justice system
through enlightened debate and democratic procedure, rather
than turning to the military to solve its crime problem, as so
often happens in Latin America. As noted by ex-Justice Minis-
ter Fernando Carrillo Flores, one of the principal architects of
the 1991 reform, the adoption of a prosecutorial system was
14. Although prosecutorial systems and inquisitorial systems are hard to define
* distinctly, I rely throughout this Article upon the following largely technical distinc-
tion. "Prosecutorial" (or its cognates "accusatorial" or "adversarial") refers to sys-
tems, such as in the United States and the United Kingdom, where the parties (prose-
cution and defense) have the responsibility of presenting evidence, and the judge or
magistrate plays a relatively neutral role. "Inquisitorial" refers to systems, as in con-
tinental Europe, where the judge or magistrate is a powerful actor in the process,
bearing the responsibility for gathering evidence as well as deciding the case's out-
come. MARY ANN GLENDON ET. AL, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 180 (1985)
[hereinafter GLENDON]. In other words, the concentration of prosecutorial and adju-
dicative powers in the same person is the quintessence of the inquisitorial scheme.
See Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country:
The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 1211 (1989). Others
note that inquisitorial systems have generally allotted greater authority to the gov-
ernment, resulting in an increased emphasis on crime control, with greater judicial
and investigative powers. Anglo-American adversarial systems, by contrast, are seen
as better guarantors of civil liberties and rights of criminal defendants. See Lawrence
J. Fassler, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in
Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANAT'L L. 245 (1991).
15. Indeed, some argue that Colombia's long history of violence against the ju-
diciary is a testimony to the courage and integrity of judges who refuse to be
threatened or bribed. In Mexico, by contrast, there has been little violence against
the judiciary, for judges have been bought or threatened into silence. Interview with
Francisco Santos, Editor-in-Chief, El Tiempo, at Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
Mass. (Mar. 10, 1992).
1992-1993]
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marked by a generous spirit of dialogue and planning, rather
than by discord and violence. 6
In order to understand this fundamental historical change,
Part I of this Article will present a brief history of the inquisito-
rial system of criminal procedure, laying the foundation for an
understanding of the unique Colombian development of crimi-
nal procedure. A description of Colombia's inquisitorial sys-
tem follows, focusing especially on structural barriers in the
previous inquisitorial system that hampered effective law en-
forcement. Part II discusses the failure of the inquisitorial sys-
tem.
A description of the prosecutorial system adopted in No-
vember 1991 is then presented in Part III, providing a broad
outline of the powers and duties of the Fisca:hz. The shift to a
prosecutorial system will be examined from the perspective of
effective law enforcement, focusing upon attitudinal and struc-
tural changes that Colombia hopes to produce through using a
prosecutorial system of criminal procedure. Part III concludes
that the new Colombian prosecutorial system has strengthened
the state's power to fight crime significantly, which should lead
to a lowering of the impunity rate. Analyzing the efficacy of
the new prosecutorial system is exceedingly difficult, however.
Colombia's prosecutorial system, implemented on July 1,
1992, has been of short duration. The Fiscalha currently is
training over 9000 prosecutors and investigators,17 and results
are not expected to take place for a year or two.' 8 Moreover, it
is difficult to be sanguine about any reform in a country as crip-
pled by violence as Colombia. Accordingly, any conclusions
about the new system's efficacy remain speculative.
Part III of this Article also raises special concerns about
the relatively unchecked police powers vested in the Fiscahh,
especially troubling given Colombia's authoritative past. Part
IV discusses the need for training as well as the institutional
restructuring that is needed in Colombia. This Article con-
16. Fernando Carrillo Flores, Presentacion a LA REVOLUCION PACIFICA DE LAJUS-
TICIA 10 (Fernando Carrillo Flores ed., 1991).
17. See Carlos Enrique Cavelier, Los Actos de Equilibrium en La Reforma de lajusticia,
in FUNDACION GALAN Y LAJUSTICIA 284 (Luis Carlos Galan ed., 1992).
18. For example, the current Fiscal, Gustavo de Greiff, estimates that Colombia
will "only begin to see real results in a year or a year and a half." Se haraJusticlh?, 530
LA SEMANA 30, June 30-July 7, 1992.
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cludes that some form of warrant process must be introduced
into the Colombian system in order to provide citizens with
minimal guarantees and protection from the Fiscalha's recently
expanded tentacular reach. Finally, this Article recommends
that continued educational and financial support from coun-
tries that use a prosecutorial system, such as the United States,
be provided to help Colombians return the rule of law to their
beleaguered country.
I. THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM
A. A Brief History of the Inquisitorial System
The inquisitorial model of criminal procedure has its roots
in the Middle Ages, as part of the Roman Catholic Church's
attempt to root out heresy during the Holy Inquisition."9 It
was finally terminated as a Church institution in the fifteenth
century. 20 The more gruesome Spanish Inquisition, however,
claimed its last victim as late as 1826 and was abolished by
Queen Mother Cristina of Spain on June 15, 1834.21
While the power of the Church declined in post-Reforma-
tion Europe, the inquisitorial system, stripped of its ecclesiasti-
cal rationale, soon spread throughout the continent, used by
secular governments to suppress crime and political opposi-
tion.22 The inquisitorial system was finally standardized in the
nineteenth century by Napoleon in the 1808 code dinstruction
criminelle, contained in the Code Napoleon .2' His armies then
spread the inquisitorial system, along with the principles of the
French Revolution, throughout continental Europe. 24 As a re-
sult of this historical evolution, the inquisitorial system, with
certain modifications, is currently in place in all the countries
of the European Community, with the exception of the United
Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, and Italy, which
adopted a mixed inquisitorial/prosecutorial system in 1988.25
19. See generally CECIL ROTH, THE SPANISH INQUISITION 36-37, 266-67 (1964).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally H. LEA, THE INQUISITION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 317-18 (1963).
23. GLENDON, supra note 14, at 50.
24. See generally ROBERT B. HOLTMAN, THE NAPOLEONIC REVOLUTION (1967).
25. For a discussion of the Italian reform, see generally Fassler, supra note 14;
Jeffrey J. Miller, Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues under the New Italian Criminal Procedure
Code and in the United States: Towards a New Understanding of Comparative Criminal Proce-
1992-19931 613
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B. Colombia's Inquisitorial System
Colombia was formed as a nation in 1819, proclaimed as
the Republic of Colombia, comprising what is now Colombia,
Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador, with Simon Bolivar as presi-
dent.26 The legal system subsequently adopted was based
upon Spanish law, especially the Spanish Code of 1822.27 The
code mandated the inquisitorial system and soon spread
throughout Spain's former colonies in Latin America. 8
Colombia reaffirmed the inquisitorial system in the 1886
Constitution which, until the 1991 reform, was the oldest liv-
ing constitution in the Americas, besides that of the United
States.29 The inquisitorial system was included in the 1938
Code of Criminal Procedure, which remained in place, with
certain modifications, until the New Code of Criminal Proce-
dure (the "New Code") was adopted on November 30, 1991.3 o
The recently created Fiscahh' has its historical antecedent
in the attempted constitutional reform of 1979.31 The idea of
that reform was to create a central prosecutor's office for cer-
tain crimes, while retaining for others the inquisitorial model
in which a neutral judge investigated, prosecuted, and decided
the case. This attempted reform was declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, however, necessitating the criminal
procedure reform of 1991.32
dure, 22 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 215 (1990); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The
New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System
on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (1992).
26. KevinJ. Lyonette, Colombia, in LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A HAND-
BOOK 76 (Claudio V6liz ed., 1985).
27. THOMAS E. WEIL ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR COLOMBIA 503 (1970).
28. See id. at 27-31.
29. Constitucidn: El Nuevo Pacto Social, EL TIEMPO, Dec. 30, 1991, at 1.
30. Nuevo Codigo de Procedimiento Penal (New Code of Criminal Procedure)
(English translation) [hereinafter N.C.P.P.] (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
31. Colombia President Urges Congress to Approve Constitutional Reform, BBC, Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 4, 1989, at ME/0526/D/1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File.
32. See Francisco Pintura, "La Fiscalia General de la Naci6n: Una Nueva Institu-
cion en Colombia," Speech given by Vicefiscal in San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 30,
1992 (on file at the Ofinha de la Fiscahh General de la Nacidn, Santefe de Bogoti, Colom-
bia).
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C. Characteristics of the Colombian Inquisitorial System
Colombia's previous criminal justice system closely fol-
lowed the inquisitorial model. Most proceedings were written,
with judges reaching decisions based upon information con-
tained in the case file. Colombian judges had multiple respon-
sibilities as inquisitory judges, including managing the criminal
investigation, performing the prosecutorial function, assuring
the defendant's basic rights, and deciding legal questions fac-
ing the accused-including his guilt or innocence.
When a crime was reported within Colombia's inquisito-
rial system, the police, the Departamento Administrativo de
Seguridad ("DAS"), Colombia's equivalent of the United States'
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 3 the instruccion criminal, or
members of the Armed Forces would investigate the facts, col-
lect evidence, and hand the case to a juez de instruccion, or in-
struction judge, who was in charge of the investigation.34 This
judge would review the evidence, direct the investigation, de-
termine pretrial release and incarceration, and make a determi-
nation as to probable cause for trial.
As soon as the instruction judge decided to bring charges
against the accused, the case was handed over to a trial judge.
Cases involving the murder or kidnapping of a non-political
person, assault and battery, property damage, stolen property,
minor drug offenses, and other misdemeanors went to theJuz-
gado de Circuito, or Circuit Court. 5 Cases of murder, crimes
against national security, and treason went to theJuzgado Supe-
rior del Distrito, or Superior Court.36 Appeals could be taken
before the Magistrates of Tribunales Superiores, or Superior Ap-
peals Court.
Briefly stated, the new system replaces the instruction
judge with a prosecutor who is responsible for the case from
the investigative stage to trial, as occurs, for example, in the
U.S. prosecutorial system. The trial judge, who previously
33. *rhe Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), an investigative and intel-
ligence-gathering force, is charged with the investigation of crimes against the inter-
nal security of the state, crimes of fraud against the state and its financial institutions,
breaches of the public faith, and crimes affecting individual liberty and human rights.
34. See Se haraJustioa?, supra note 18.
35. HOWARD I. BLUTSTEIN ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR COLOMBIA 412 (1977)
[hereinafter AREA HANDBOOK FOR COLOMBIA].
36. Id.
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played an active role in the trial by interrogating the accused, is
now limited to hearing evidence, ensuring fairness in the trial
process, judging the culpability of the accused, and imposing
punishment. As such, the judge is relatively neutral in the pro-
cess, except in the case of plea bargaining, in which she con-
trols the legality of the agreement.3
7
II. FAILURE OF THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM
Why did Colombia's inquisitorial system fail? Two main
reasons are generally given. The first reason for failure in-
volved the chronic investigative incapacity of the instruction
judges. The second reason for failure involved the lack of a
hierarchical structure to control the functions of the independ-
ent instruction judges and the judicial police.38
A. Judges, Not Detectives: Investigative Incapacity in the
Inquisitorial System
The chronic investigative incapacity of the instruction
judges sprang from many sources. First of all, the instruction
judges were trained as judges, not as detectives or as police.
As such, judges were often unskilled and inefficient in the com-
plex craft of criminal investigation.3 9 This problem was exac-
erbated as the techniques of modern crime, especially drug-
trafficking and white collar crime, became more complex and
international, with no corresponding investment in technical
training and equipment for the instruction judges. In addition,
instruction judges were not specialized by crime. Conse-
quently, judges were confronted with the formidable task of
being simultaneous experts in white collar crime, narcoterror-
ism, crimes to property, etc., with predictably dismal results.
Second, although the instruction judges were a mix of
judge and detective, their training prepared them more for the
former role than the latter. Consequently, they tended to view
their function as seeking justice and fairness in the criminal
process as judges, rather than increasing the conviction rate as
37. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 17.
38. See German Augusto Robles Marun, Secretario General, Fiscalzh General de la
Nacidn, "Fiscah General de la Nacidn" (on file at the Oficina de la Fiscah General de la
Nacidn, Santefe de Bogoti, Colombia).
39. See, e.g., Giraldo & Yepes, supra note 5, at 41.
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prosecutors.4 ° As a result, instruction judges often were insuf-
ficiently zealous in their investigative task, which contributed
to the high impunity rate.
The instruction judge's self-perception as a referee, not as
a player, in the criminal process had an additional ripple-effect
on the judicial police. The police often became frustrated
when the intensive work of identifying and collecting evidence
came to naught if the instruction judge decided to free the ac-
cused because the evidence was obtained by torture or by the
violation of human or criminal rights.4 ' Indeed, the police
often viewed judges with suspicion, finding them incompetent
or corrupt. 42 As a result, police tended to take justice into
their own hands, refusing to hand over evidence, detaining
prisoners indefinitely, or even torturing or killing them if they
felt it necessary.43
Further, instruction judges were forced to serve two mas-
ters, dividing their time between investigating and judging,
which frustrated aggressive and thorough criminal investiga-
tions. Finally, instruction judges were primarily recent law
school graduates, low-paid in a high-risk profession. Bribery
and intimidation played a role as well in the investigative inca-
pacity of the instruction judges.4 4
B. Hierarchical Problems with the Inquisitorial System
Coupled with the chronic investigative capacity of the in-
struction judges was the lack of coordination of criminal inves-
tigations in a sole entity responsible for fighting crime.45
Under the former system, the instruction judges were granted
a great deal of autonomy, working independently in their in-
vestigative efforts. Indeed, the instruction judge was the sole
person with the power to direct the criminal investigation.46
40. Interview with Ana Maria Salazar in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 28, 1992).
41. See Tovar, supra note 2, at 238.
42. Dan McGillis, Attempted Application of Criminal Justice Analytic Frame-
work to the Current Colombian Reforms 3 (1991) (unpublished paper on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
43. Id.
44. See Vicki Quade, Justice Under a Death Sentence, 16 BARRISTER 12, 15 (1989-
90).
45. See Pintura supra note 32, at 7.
46. See Carlos Eduardo Lozano Tovar, La impunidad y las formas de combatirla, in
JUSTICIA, DERECHOS HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD, supra note 2, at 203.
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Effective law enforcement was accordingly crippled as isolated
judges were ill-informed and ill-supported by other judges and
the judicial police. Further, there was no clear linkage between
the instruction judges and the judicial police, as the inquisito-
rial system lacked a technical corps of criminal investigators
exclusively devoted to the service of the instruction judge and
under her direction. 47
A related hierarchical problem was that the responsibili-
ties among the various law enforcement agencies assigned to
assist the instruction judges were unclear and overlapping.48
Effective law enforcement was thus crippled by turf battles and
the needless duplication of investigative efforts. Also, the lim-
ited presence-or total absence-of law enforcement agencies
in large parts of Colombia's national territory, especially in ru-
ral areas, allowed criminals free reign. 49 This situation was ex-
acerbated by territorial limitations on the instruction judges,
who could investigate crimes only in their appropriate jurisdic-
tions.5 0 Finally, the lack of an institutional structure to protect
victims, witnesses, and other intervenors in the criminal pro-
cess deterred many from assisting the judges and police in
their investigative efforts, contributing to the high impunity
rate.5'
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF
THE NATION: THE FISCALiA
In light of the above problems, a drastic change was
needed in the organization and implementation of criminal
47. See Tribunal Superior de Orden Publico, Comentarios a la ponencia: "Im-
punidady lasformas de combatirla," inJUSTCIA, DERECHOS HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD, supra
note 2, at 215.
48. Twig Mowatt, 'Invisible'Justices for Drug Cases, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 11,
1991, at Ai. For example, the opinion of Fernando Carrillo Flores, ex-Justice Minis-
ter is that " '[t]he greatest source of impunity here has been the lack of a coordinated
effort at assembling evidence.' " Id. (quoting Fernando Carrillo Flores).
49. See generally Bruce M. Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF.
70 (Fall 1988). Indeed, during most of the nineteenth century, an intense regional-
ism pervaded the newly independent republic. As a result, there was no professional,
centrally controlled police force until 1891, when an experienced French police com-
missioner was hired to organize and train a central police corps and the National
Police were formed as part of the Ministry of Interior. See AREA HANDBOOK FOR CO-
LOMBIA, supra note 35, at 505.
50. See Rocco, supra note 4, at 3.
51. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 8.
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justice in Colombia. The existing judicial system had seriously
diminished the confidence of Colombians in their political sys-
tem. The general skepticism toward the judicial process was
seen as a manifestation of the national crisis prompting the
constitutional reforms of 1991.52
In December of 1990, President Gaviria called for elec-
tions to choose members of the national constituent assembly,
conferring extraordinary powers on the lawmakers to revise
the existing constitution. After six months of debate, the sev-
enty-four-member Constituent Assembly, including, among
others, members of the business and financial community,
union leaders, indigenous peoples, ex-guerrillas, and prestigi-
ous lawyers, produced a 380-article constitution with fifty-nine
transitory articles.5 3 President Gaviria signed the new consti-
tution into law on July 4, 1991, praising it as a "peace treaty
and a new instrument for national reconciliation. ' 54
As part of this constitutional reform, a special thirty-six-
member legislative committee was chosen to write a new code
of criminal procedure, which went into effect July 1, 1992. 55
Resulting from this commission's efforts, the 1991 Constitu-
tion provides for the Office of the Prosecutor General of the
Nation, or the Fiscaha, whose basic function is to investigate
crimes and handle cases from the investigatory to the trial
stage.56 A broad outline of the powers granted the Fiscalh in
the 1991 Constitution follows.
A. General Duties and Powers of the Fiscalia
The Fiscahh serves as Colombia's chief prosecutor, and is
elected for a four-year period by the Supreme Court.5 She
must meet the same qualifications as a member of the Supreme
Court. The office is considered part of the judicial branch, but
52. See LA REVOLUCION PACIFICA DE LAJUSTICIA, supra note 16, at 9 (discussing
comments of ex-Justice Minister Fernando Carrillo Flores).
53. A Look at the New Book of Rules; Congressional Clientelism is Curbed; Judiciary Re-
formed, LATIN AM. WKLY REP., July 25, 1991, at 4.
54. Carlos Obregon, Constitucion: El Nuevo Pacto Social, EL TIEMPO, Dec. 30,
1991, at 1.
55. See CONSTITUci6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], trans. art. 27.
56. Fiscalia General de la Naci6n arts. 4 & 6, [hereinafter F.G.N.], in LA REVOLU-
ClON PACIFICA DE LAJUSTICIA, supra note 16, at 99.
57. Id. art. 2.
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with administrative and budgetary autonomy.58
The Fiscalzh's general prosecutorial duties include acting,
either on its own initiative or in response to a complaint or a
formal charge, to investigate offenses, and to charge alleged
offenders before the appropriate tribunal.5 9 Other duties of
the Fiscaha include ensuring the appearance in court of crimi-
nal suspects, 60 determining and declaring whether there are
grounds to proceed with an investigation, 61 directing the po-
lice in their investigations,62 and ensuring the protection of
witnesses. 63 The Fiscah is also responsible for investigating
all facts, inculpatory and exculpatory, for the accused.
The Fiscah has special duties as well. Among these are
the investigation and charging of high officials,' the appoint-
ment and dismissal of employees of the Fiscalha ,65 the formula-
tion of policy on criminal matters,6 6 the granting of temporary
powers to governmental agencies under the control of the Fis-
calha ,67 and the provision of information to the government re-
garding criminal investigations.68
B. Jurisdiction of the Fiscalia
With the creation of the Fiscaha, the breadth of Colombian
law enforcement has been dramatically broadened. The Fis-
cahh's jurisdiction covers the entire country, with regional of-
fices in the five major Colombian cities. 69 The regional offices
are further broken down into sectional offices, located in each
judicial district. 70 The sectional offices are broken down into
local prosecutorial offices, known as Unidades de Fiscahh ("local
Fiscales"), under the direct supervision of the sectional of-
58. Id. art. 1.
59. Id. art. 3.
60. Id. art. 3, § 3.
61. Id. art. 3, § 2.
62. Id. art. 3, § 6
63. Id. art. 3, § 7.
64. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 251(1).
65. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 11.
66. Id. art. 7.
67. CONSTITUCi6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 251 (4).
68. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 8; see CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Con-
stitution], art. 251 (5).
69. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 14.
70. Id.
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fices.7 !
The local Fiscales handle the day-to-day prosecutorial du-
ties, roughly equivalent to an Office of the District Attorney in
the United States. Their responsibilities include investigating
crimes and bringing charges; 72 directing investigations under-
taken by the judicial police;7 3 expediting arrest orders, wire-
taps, mail covers, electronic surveillance; and other actions in-
herent to criminal investigations.74
The local Fiscales are assisted in their prosecutorial duties
by the judicial police, whose duties include receiving criminal
complaints and conducting investigations, 75 as well as under-
taking basic police functions such as wire-tapping, mail covers,
etc., at the direction of the local Fiscales.76 While the local Fis-
cales have broad discretion in directing the judicial police, ulti-
mate supervision rests with the Fiscalh, who is in charge of di-
recting and coordinating the judicial police in their various
functions."
C. Law Enforcement Agencies Under the Control of the Fiscalia
Along with the judicial police, the new constitution pro-
vides for other law enforcement agencies to assist the Fiscahth
in criminal investigations. The Centro de Informacidn sobre Ac-
tividades Delectivas (the "Center for Information on Criminal
Activities") is responsible for organizing the collection and
processing of all basic information for criminal investiga-
tions.7 8 The Cuerpo Ticnico (the "Technical Corps") is charged
with the organization of all technical and scientific information
required for the development of investigations. ° In addition,
the Division de Criminalstica (the "Criminalistics Division") is
71. Id. art. 15.
72. Id. art. 40, § 1.
73. Id. art. 40, § 2. The term "judicial police" is used broadly to include the
three major Colombia police forces, the Cuerpo Tecnico, the DIJIN/SIJIN of the Na-
tional Police, and the DAS (the Colombian equivalent of the FBI). Ana Maria
Salazar, Brief Comments Regarding the Constitutional Reforms to the Colombian Criminal Jus-
tice System,July 11, 1991, at 3 (on file at the Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Mass.).
74. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 40, § 4.
75. Id. art. 47, § 1.
76. Id. art. 47, §§ 2, 4.
77. Id. art. 42.
78. See generally id. art. 24.
79. See generally id. art. 43.
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responsible for all matters requiring criminalistics, including
the running of laboratories and coordinating the activities of
the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science.80 Fi-
nally, the Escuela de Investigacidn Criminal y Criminaltica (the
"School of Criminal Investigations and Criminalistics") is
designed to develop educational programs for the nation's law
enforcement agencies.8'
D. Who's Watching the Watchdog?
With such increased powers of law enforcement in the Fis-
caha, the question naturally arises concerning what agency is
responsible for monitoring the Fiscaha. The Fiscaha, as well as
being required to fulfill its prosecutorial function in conformity
with established law82 and human rights, 83 is itself policed by
the Ofictha de Veedurth (the "Office of Professional Responsibil-
ity").84 This office is responsible for the ethical conduct of the
Fiscalh, including determining ethical codes of conduct, visit-
ing local Fiscales and judicial police to determine the propriety
of conduct, and receiving complaints and investigating alleged
constitutional and human rights violations by the Fiscales and
the judicial police.85
Furthermore, the new constitution provides for the office
of the Procurador General de la Nacin, 86 who is the head of the
Public Ministry and in charge of protecting human rights87 and
supervising, investigating, and sanctioning public functionaries
who violate the law. 88 As such, the Fiscalh falls under its juris-
diction. The Procuradunh is responsible for overseeing the pre-
liminary investigations of the judicial police,89 protecting the
rights of the accused,90 and ensuring that the conduct of the
80. See generally id. art. 44.
81. See generally id. art. 32.
82. Id. art. 5.
83. Id. art. 6.
84. See id. art. 25.
85. Id. art. 25, § 7.
86. CONSTITUC06N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 275; see N.C.P.P.,
supra note 30, arts. 131-35.
87. CONSTiruci6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 277, § 2.
88. Id. art. 277, § 6.
89. N.C.P.P., supra note 30, art. 134.
90. Id. art. 132.
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Fiscahis and the judiciary conforms with the law. 9' As an en-
forcement mechanism, the new constitution provides for the
accidn de tutela, in which citizens represented by the Procuradurnh
have the right to a hearing in front of a judge for the immedi-
ate protection of their fundamental constitutional rights.92 In-
digents are guaranteed a public defender to protect their
rights.9
A final protection is that the government is prohibited
from abolishing or altering the basic organizations concerned
with the criminal process-indictment and trial, even during
(legally permitted) states of exception. 94 This is an important
protection, for under the state of siege provisions enacted dur-
ing the 1970s, many crimes by civilians-including kidnapping,
assault, and any crime involving the use of arms-fell under
the jurisdiction of the military courts.9 Although these courts
were arguably more efficient, swift, and stringent than regular
courts, they had the effect of tacitly conceding that the ordi-
nary judicial process had failed-precisely the situation the
New Code seeks to address.
With this broad outline of the Fiscalth in mind, we now
turn to the fundamental question concerning the new
prosecutorial system: Can it enhance effective law enforce-
ment, thereby reducing the high impunity rate plaguing Co-
lombia?
IV. EFFECTIVE LA W ENFORCEMENT
A. Training Judges to Become Prosecutors, Or How to Teach Old
Dogs New Tricks
As part of the constitutional reform that created the new
prosecutorial system, an agreement was reached in which the
new prosecutors must be drawn from the ranks of the former
instruction judges.96 This raises the question of how the new
91. Id. art. 133.
92. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 5.
93. N.C.P.P., supra note 30, art. 140.
94. CONSTITIJCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 252. On Novem-
ber 8, 1992, "President Cesar Gaviria declared a national state of emergency after
leftist rebels detonated more than 30 bombs across Colombia." Emergency is Declared
in Colombia, supra note 8.
95. AREA HANDBOOK FOR COLOMBIA, supra note 35, at 411.
96. See CONSTITucI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], trans. art. 27.
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system will change the mentality and working habits of the
over 8000 former instruction judges so that they become zeal-
ous prosecutors. A change in attitude is drastically needed, be-
cause the previous system lacked a party interested exclusively
in convictions. The police were interested in making arrests, the
judges in preserving legality and procedural rights, the victims
in compensation, and the defendants, of course, in being ac-
quitted.97
The new system promises to produce what may be called
for lack of a better term "trickle down convictions." Otherwise
stated, impunity should be lowered in the new system if the
prosecutors are adequately pressured by their superiors to
prosecute criminals zealously, with the lowering of the impu-
nity rate the measure of their performance. In the past, the
lowering of the impunity rate could not be used as an indicator
of an instruction judge's efficiency, as she was concurrently re-
sponsible for defending justice and fair play in the criminal
process.
A change in prosecutorial attitude should help to lower
the impunity rate by its ripple-effect on the judicial police as
well. The prosecutors will not be seen, as the instruction
judges were, as working at cross-purposes with the police, but
as partners in a collective law enforcement effort.98 Working
together should lessen the impunity rate, especially if the Fis-
calia takes care to train the judicial police to use their investiga-
tive tools within the constraints of the New Code. 99
The new prosecutorial system should also enhance effec-
tive law enforcement through the creation of prosecutorial
units focusing on particular types of crime. In the previous
system, judges were not specialized by crime and remained in-
dependent generalists. Efficiency should be enhanced as pros-
ecutors develop expertise in various criminal areas. In order
to achieve this, however, the prosecutors must be given train-
ing in conducting criminal investigations, as their previous sta-
tus as neutral magistrates leaves them relatively unprepared
for this role.' 00
97. McGillis, supra note 42, at 12, 13.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id.
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Finally, the new prosecutors should be better able to con-
tribute to effective law enforcement because their tasks will
now be limited exclusively to prosecuting. Because the judicial
role will be limited to hearing cases, the prosecutors will be
able to spend more time conducting investigations and prepar-
ing their cases, which should lessen the impunity rate as well.
But teaching old dogs new tricks may prove to be a formi-
dable task. According to Vice Fiscal Francisco Pintura, "[t]he
implementation of the accusatory system in Colombia and the
development of the Fiscaha General de La Nacidn requires much
advice and the fruit of experience" from countries using
prosecutorial systems.'l0 Colombia has been fortunate to have
received precisely this type of training in criminalistics and
criminal investigation from countries such as the United
States.10 2 In addition, in August 1991, theBush administra-
tion approved US$36,000,000 for a six-year project to support
judicial reform in Colombia. The goal is essentially to improve
the Colombian criminal justice system so that drug traffickers
can be brought to justice without extradition to the United
States.10 3 The United States has given technical as well as edu-
cational support.104
Unfortunately, this aid only goes so far. Colombia's tran-
sition to a prosecutorial system is suffering due to a lack of
funds. As noted by the president of the Supreme Court ofJus-
tice, Pedro Lafont Pianetta, the Fiscalh "still does not have the
infrastructure for the functioning of the new institution."'' 0 5
101. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 20.
102. Interview with Zahir Casas, Director, School of Criminal Investigation and
Criminalistics, in Bogoti, Colombia, (Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Casas].
103. See AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, POLITICAL MURDER AND REFORM IN Co-
LOMBIA: THE VIOLENCE CONTINUES 111 (1992). Critics note, however, that the inter-
est of the U.S. government is limited to reforming the Colombian criminal justice
system to fight drugtrafficking, and that U.S. officials have expressed little or no in-
terest in the other important judicial reforms enacted in the 1991 Constitution. In
addition, A.I.D. officials assisting Colombia in its transition to a prosecutorial system
limited their contact to high government officials, eschewing talks with the judges
who in practice will implement the new system. As a result, many judges-cum-prose-
cutors remain confused about the functioning of the prosecutorial system. Interview
with Fernando Royas, Director, Instituto Latinamericano de Servicios Legales Al-
ternativos, in Bogota, Colombia (Sept. 14, 1992).
104. For example, the United States recently gave the Colombian government
seven helicopters, 39 trucks, 28 motorcycles, and 15 German shepherds to aid in its
anti-drug efforts. Fiscalth no tienefuturo, por ahora, EL TIEMPO, Aug. 27, 1992, at 3A.
105. Id.
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The Fiscahiaz has yet to receive adequate material and technical
support to fulfill its constitutional role.' 0 6 Furthermore, ethi-
cal training, a crucial check on the increased power of the pros-
ecutors, has been limited to the prosecutors located in Bogota',
due to lack of money. 0 7 Regrettably, ambitious constitutional
reforms, without the funds to back them up, may remain mere
words on paper.
B. Institutional Restructuring
Effective law enforcement promises to be enhanced by the
restructuring of the prosecutorial system as well as by the
change in attitude of the new prosecutors.
Criminal investigations in the past suffered from the lack
of coordination in the collection of evidence, resulting in the
needless duplication of investigatory efforts. The 1991 Code
of Criminal Procedure attempts to correct this problem by
making the Fiscalh responsible for directing and coordinating
the various functions of the judicial police at the federal
level.' 08 Further, the Fiscah is ordered to coordinate and con-
trol investigations, to limit the competition between various
law enforcement agencies. 0 9
The Center for Information on Criminal Activities will as-
sist the Fiscaha in this task. The Center for Information on
Criminal Activities has been directed to develop mechanisms
for the exchange of information among law enforcement agen-
cies.O The judicial police also will implement mechanisms to
avoid the duplication of forces in the development of criminal
investigations."' Finally, the Technical Corps as well is man-
dated to work with other agencies to promote the coordination
of investigations that should be undertaken jointly."'
Those familiar with the U.S. law enforcement system may
be skeptical of this ambitious scheme. Efforts at coordinating
information-gathering and investigations among U.S. law en-
forcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
106. Id.
107. Casas, supra note 102.
108. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 3.
109. Id. art. 11.
110. Id. art. 24 (3).
111. Id. art. 42 (5).
112. Id. art. 43 (4).
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tion and the Drug Enforcement Agency, have proven difficult.
Law enforcement agencies often compete for funding and
jurisdiction, with institutional pride mixed in to complicate
matters.' 1
Colombia, however, has shown great advances in this area.
For example, the training schools for DAS and the police are
currently working together, developing training programs for
the new prosecutors. Similar programs with other law enforce-
ment agencies are foreseen in the near future. 1 4 Further-
more, government officials note that they have received great
support from the various law enforcement agencies in the co-
ordination of training and investigative efforts."I5
In tandem with the cooperation of law enforcement agen-
cies will be the cooperation among prosecutors, who will now
work in prosecutorial units. Effective law enforcement suffered
in the past from independent and autonomous judges, with no
hierarchical superior monitoring their activities. The new sys-
tem, by contrast, utilizes a pyramidal and vertical structure, in
which all prosecutorial units will act under the direction of
their hierarchical superiors and, ultimately, the Fiscahh.t 16
Effective law enforcement should be enhanced by this con-
centration of prosecutorial duties in the Fiscahh. More impor-
tantly, newer and more complex forms of crime-drugtraffick-
ing, white collar crime, etc.,-cannot be fought by lone individ-
uals. As is becoming manifestly evident in international law
enforcement, teamwork-both within and between nations-is
needed to combat the increasingly well-organized and well-fi-
nanced criminal organizations operating on Colombian soil." 7
Further, opportunities for corruption in the new system should
be reduced significantly, because the prosecutors will be sub-
ject to the close scrutiny of their superiors. 1 8
Effective law enforcement should also be enhanced as the
113. See, e.g., Rudolph W. Giuliani, Organizing Law Enforcement as Well as Organized
Crime, 45 U.S. PUBLIC ADMIN. REv. 712 (1985).
114. Casas, supra note 102.
115. Id.
116. F.G.N., supra note 56, art. 19.
117. See William Drozdiak; World Crime Groups Expand Cooperation, Spheres of Influ-
ence, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1992, at A12. As international crime groups have been
working together rather than competing against each other, "cooperation among in-
ternational police authorities [has become] much more vital." Id.
118. McGillis, supra note 42, at 17.
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judicial police are now subordinate to the Fiscaha. 19 This is
important for two main reasons. First, the prosecutorial units
will now have a special corps of investigators working exclu-
sively at their direction. As such, criminal investigations will
be of national scope, with police investigations subject to the
supervision of the Fiscah.
Of equal importance, due to the history of human rights
abuses by the Colombia police, it is necessary to have a central
institution-such as the Fiscalha -to monitor and control police
investigations. In the past, the police tended to extend their
duties beyond being auxiliaries of the judicial system in the war
against crime to being auxiliaries of the military in the war
against guerrillas. The new constitution, by making the Fiscalha
responsible for coordinating the judicial police, will help to en-
sure that the police are not soldiers with a policeman's badge.
In part for this concern, Colombian police, while retaining
some autonomy in the preliminary investigative stage, ° may
not order an arrest, search a dwelling or a person, intercept
communications, or do any act which would violate a person's
privacy without a prosecutorial order.1 2 1 Indeed, once an in-
vestigation has begun, the police may act only at the direction
of the prosecutor. 22 A "pure" prosecutorial system, such as in
the United States, in which police generally have the complete
responsibility for the development of investigations, acting
more or less independently, would be a grave error in Colom-
bia, given the history of the abuse of police power. 123
It should be added that the use of prosecutorial units, as
well as enhancing law enforcement, should have the salutary
effect of protecting prosecutors. Although the secret court sys-
tem already handles the cases typically associated with violence
to the judiciary-drugs and terrorism-prosecutors are still ex-
posed to threats (and bribery). However, the new system no
longer has individual judges with individual responsibility for
cases. Rather, prosecutorial units investigate and bring
charges. Unless a criminal suspect tries to threaten or bribe an
entire prosecutorial unit, individual prosecutors will be pro-
119. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 18.
120. N.C.P.P., supra note 30, art. 312.
121. Id. art. 313.
122. Id.
123. See Pintura, supra note 32, at 19.
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tected. Simply put, it is far easier to bribe or to intimidate a
lone instruction judge, as in the past, than a nation-wide
prosecutorial office. 124
To illustrate this point by contrast, consider the U.S. sys-
tem. In the United States, few judges and prosecutors receive
threats, much less are assassinated, even though powerful
criminal organizations such as the Mafia exist. Obviously, a
facile comparison between Colombia and the United States
should not be made. However, U.S. prosecutors and judges
are protected in part because the determination of guilt or in-
nocence is not vested in individual actors in the criminal process,
but in units or offices. The individuals subject to intimidation in
the United States tend to be those persons upon whom the
case often rests, namely, witnesses. 12 5
Accordingly, one of the most important changes in the
new prosecutorial system is the protection of witnesses, vic-
tims, and intervenors in the criminal process. 126 With protec-
tion comes cooperation. By providing testimony, Colombians
will not only work to lessen the impunity rate, but to fulfill
their civic duty by helping to return the rule of law to their
beleaguered country.
C. Fiscalia General or General Fiscal?
While the above reforms should contribute to effective law
enforcement, concern should be raised about the tremendous
police powers which have been vested in the Fiscalh, with no
warrant requirement. For example, the Fiscahh may give arrest
orders, 27 order wire-taps, 28 and conduct searches and
seizures, 9 without obtaining prior approval of a judge or
magistrate. Furthermore, while the new constitution states
that a person may not be arrested or detained without the writ-
124. McGillis, supra note 42, at 23.
125. As an illustration, consider the Mafia's alleged plan to kill the wife and chil-
dren of Salvatore (Sammy the Bull) Gravano, chief witness in the trial of John Gotti,
head of the Gambino family-the largest Mafia organization in the United States.
Matthew Brelis, Code Betrayal Seen as Sign of Mafia Erosion, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20,
1992, at 17.
126. See Pintura, supra note 32.
127. See N.C.P.P., supra note 30, arts. 37(4), 40(4).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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ten order of a "judicial authority,"' 130 this authority has been
interpreted to be the Fiscaha, not a neutral judge. In the U.S.
system, by contrast, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution provides that search and seizures, such as those under-
taken by the Fiscah, may only be conducted under a warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate, upon probable cause, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized. 13 1 Wire-taps as well are subject to the war-
rant requirement. 3 2
During the constitutional reform period, the fear ex-
pressed by many that the Fiscalha presented the potential to
convert itself into an extremely powerful entity appears to have
been proven correct.'"3 During the constitutional convention,
some felt that the Fiscaha should be part of the executive
branch, appointed and removed at will by the president, as
fighting crime is an executive function. As an office of the ex-
ecutive branch, the Fiscahh would have sufficient power to nip
crime in the bud, and not just react after the fact, as judges
did. 134
Others expressed concern, however, about placing in-
creased power in the executive branch in a country with a long
history of authoritative abuse of presidential power. 135 From
this perspective, independent instruction judges in the judicial
branch had been a force against arbitrary executive power, and
this separation should be retained in the new constitution.'
However, placing the Fiscaha in the judicial branch has not
checked its power, as supporters had hoped, for Medusa-like,
power unchecked in one branch will grow anew unchecked in
another.
The reason that this placing of such unchecked investiga-
tive powers in the Fiscaha is of such concern is that Colombia
has violated a fundamental principle of the prosecutorial sys-
130. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [Constitution], art. 28.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
132. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
prescribes the procedures for obtaining and execution of electronic surveillance ac-
tivities by federal and state law enforcement authorities. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521
(1992).
133. See Giraldo & Yepes, supra note 5, at 41.
134. See Flores, supra note 10, at 13.
135. See Giraldo & Yepes, supra note 5, at 41.
136. Id.
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tem, namely, the separation of the prosecutorial and the judi-
cial function. 13 7 According to the New Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the Fiscaha both directs and decides the legality of the
criminal investigation. Simultaneously playing the role of
prosecutor and judge, however, with the consequent un-
checked power, is impermissible, even unimaginable, in a
prosecutorial system.
While the judge in the prosecutorial system is passive in
the investigative stage, she must be vigilant in relation to the
detention of persons, mail covers, wire-tips, search and
seizure, etc., for the judge is the sole protector of a person's
liberty in the prosecutorial scheme. 3 ' From the Anglo-Ameri-
can perspective, the new Colombian system represents less a
Lockean system of minimal government respecting the rights
of citizens, and more a Hobbesian Leviathan capable of prob-
ing into the most intimate and private areas of a person's life,
all in the name of law and order and investigative efficiency.
While the Colombian reformers, although looking to foreign
models, sought to create a system reflective of Colombia's ex-
isting legal system, values, and legal history,' 39 and not to rep-
licate foreign models, 40 they appear to have overlooked the
provision of constitutional limits on the state's investigative
power adopted in prosecutorial systems generally, a troubling
scotoma in the reformers' vision.
Colombians defend this relatively unbridled power of the
Fiscah in several ways. One, since the system is a labelled a
mixed inquisitorial/prosecutorial one, some feel this un-
checked power in the Fiscaha is simply an outgrowth of the
greater powers invested in the state in inquisitorial systems
generally. Furthermore, some argue, the new Fiscales can call
upon their previous experience as dual prosecutors/judges
and thereby exercise self-restraint in exercising the powerful
and probing criminal investigative techniques they have re-
cently been given.
For those skeptical of the "self-restraint" or "self-polic-
137. Reinaldo Botero Bedoya, Derecho de Defenso, Sistema Acusatorio, y Fis-
cah'a, 8 (unpublished paper on file at the Andean Commission ofJurists, Colombian
Section, Bogoti, Colombia).
138. Id.
139. See Cavelier, supra note 17, at 283.
140. See Flores, supra note 10.
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ing" argument, especially in light of Colombia's history of
abuse of state power, others argue that the new institutions of
the Oficina de Veeduria and the Procuraduria provide sufficient
mechanisms to control the Fiscahh.14' However, it appears that
these agencies will fail to adequately prevent the abuse of the
power of the Fiscaha' for two central reasons. First, neither in-
stitution works to prevent the violation of a citizen's constitu-
tional rights before it occurs. Rather, both agencies are .reac-
tive, only working after a citizen's rights have been violated. In
the U.S. system, by contrast, the role of the neutral magistrate
in limiting and controlling criminal investigations works to nip
violations of constitutional rights in the bud, rather than react
after the fact.
Second, in the U.S. system, each and every citizen is pro-
tected from the intrusive power of the state through the proce-
dural guarantees enacted in the Fourth Amendment. The dan-
ger in Colombia is that the inequality in material conditions
will be replicated in the enforcement of constitutional and
human rights. Stated differently, because the Oficzfia de Veedurth
and the Procuradunh are reactive rather than proactive institu-
tions, the potential exists that actions designed to protect indi-
vidual, constitutional, and human rights will be limited to
those with power in the system. The U.S. system, by providing
a review of the government's decision to investigate or arrest
any citizen, rich or poor, presents less possibility for govern-
mental indifference or inaction.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Colombia has embarked on an ambitious, some say revo-
lutionary, project to reform its criminal justice system. The
thoughtfulness and respect shown for the rule of law by the
Colombian reformers should serve as a source of pride for all
Colombians, as well as for those intimately concerned with her
future.
In order to make the dream of returning the rule of law to
this country a reality, however, certain reforms and changes
should be undertaken. The optimal reform would be at the
constitutional level, eliminating the Fiscalh's power to autono-
141. See Casas, supra note 102.
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mously order actions which affect the fundamental rights of cit-
izens: capture orders, detentions, search and seizures, etc.
The potential for abuse by an uncontrolled Fiscahta' is too great
to go ignored for long. Americans learned from their treat-
ment' by the British government during the colonial period of
the potential for abuse of governmental power. Only after a
bloody revolution and a constitutional convention were Ameri-
canstfinally provided with a Bill of Rights ensuring them mini-
mal guarantees and protection from the power of the state.
The problem in Colombia is that the high rate of impunity and
the consequent need to bring criminals to justice may blind
some to the necessity of providing protection mechanisms en-
suring citizens of fundamental rights of privacy and controlling
the tentacular power of the state. 142 Colombia has recently
served as a light to other nations in that judicial, not bloody,
revolutions provide the path for peace and justice in this
world. Hopefully this message will not go unheeded as Co-
lombia contemplates further reforms in its criminal justice sys-
tem.
Second, Colombia desperately needs aid, both monetary
and educational, from countries using prosecutorial systems.
Accordingly, programs recently initiated by the United States
to train the new prosecutors should be maintained and
strengthened. Furthermore, scientific help from the United
States should continue to be given as well, because the techni-
cal know-how to commit crime is increasing faster than Colom-
bia has the ability to fight it. And, above all, aid from the
United States should be linked to human rights reforms. Any
aid given must be well-monitored to ensure that it goes to help
fight crime, not to kill guerrillas, as has occurred in the recent
past. 143
Third, assuming that constitutional reform does not pro-
vide for some judicial control of the Fiscalha, the Oficnha de
142. Indeed, recent polls indicate that a majority of Colombians would like to
see the death penalty, whose prohibition is considered one of the most important
human rights guarantees in the new constitution, instituted to fight guerrillas and
narcotics traffickers. See Don Podesta, Colombians Lash Out at Violence: Public Backs War
on Cartels, Rebels, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1992, at A33.
143. See Chris afJochnik, A Military Non-solution: U.S. Policy and the War on
Drugs in Colombia (unpublished paper on file at the Andean Commission of Jurists,
Colombian Section, Bogoti, Colombia).
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Veedunh and the Procuraduna should be closely monitored by
human rights organizations to ensure that they adequately po-
lice the Fiscah and that human rights violations in the criminal
process do not go unpunished. With the increased power of
the Fiscalth must come the increased power to question its ac-
tions, so that increased investigative powers are not abused.
Finally, it must be recognized that the crime plaguing Co-
lombia has sources both structural and moral. The poverty of
living conditions in Colombia has proved fertile ground for the
growth of crime. Without change in socio-economic condi-
tions, as well as in the criminal justice system, Colombia
promises to continue to be unable to control its crime problem
and return the rule of law to its citizens. Of equal importance,
poverty in the United States-both material and spiritual-has
produced a demand for drugs which Colombians and others
are all too ready to supply. Changing criminal justice systems
is a step in the right direction. Changing social conditions and
values is a step exponentially more difficult, yet essential none-
theless.
